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I. MOTIVATION 
Cloud technology offers the opportunity for efficient 
utilisation of resources from offering compute, data, storage, 
and network capabilities as services on demand. However, it 
also raises significant concerns regarding the security, 
privacy, governance and compliance of the data and services 
offered through it. This is because the deployment of 
software applications and data through cloud infrastructures 
introduces several security problems, including 
compromises of integrity, confidentiality [3][4] and/or 
privacy of customer data on clouds [4][6]; software 
protection [10]; reduced application and data availability 
[2][5][3]; and authentication, authorization and accounting 
(AAA) vulnerabilities [3]. Also, current cloud 
infrastructures have opaque service offerings where users 
cannot monitor the underlying physical infrastructure.. 
Security and compliance verification in clouds are 
tricky as security can be affected by interference between 
features and behavior of all the inter-dependent services at 
any of the layers in the cloud stack as well as by dynamic 
changes in them [3]. Dynamic changes in the data isolation 
scheme operated by a cloud may, for example, affect the 
privacy of the data processed by a software service in the 
same cloud, compromising the service’s compliance to an 
organizational privacy policy or, worse, to a law or a 
regulation. Similarly, changes in cloud messaging services 
at the platform layer may affect the availability and/or 
reliability of the software services that rely on those 
messaging services. The same may happen to non-
repudiation properties as, for example, compromising the 
services’ compliance to an internationally acknowledged 
certified messaging scheme like Universal Postal Union. 
Run-time changes affecting service (or process) 
properties may create unexpected and unwanted liabilities, 
as final users of services may hold the service supplier 
responsible for failing to withhold properties, even if 
violations have been caused by dependencies between the 
services and the cloud where they are executed. Such 
dependencies do not cause only bottom-up effects. 
Inefficiencies of software services, for instance, may affect 
overall cloud performance and denial-of-service attacks to 
specific services at the software layer may affect availability 
of services at all other layers in the cloud stack. 
The risk arising from such dependencies is exacerbated 
by the absence of common ownership and the evolving 
population of services at all layers of a cloud. Hence, in 
current realizations of cloud computing there are no 
guarantees that there will be no interactions between cloud 
service features that may cause security vulnerabilities and 
violations of security properties, even if pre-operational 
verification tests have been performed [3][5].  
A common approach to enhancing assurance and 
reducing risks in such settings is to rely on the certification 
of different services in clouds. Certification has a long 
history as a mechanism for verifying properties and 
increasing trust in software systems. While traditional 
certification techniques apply mostly to monolithic systems, 
recent research demonstrates the feasibility of security 
certification for service based systems and processes [11]. 
Research on service certification has focused on the use of 
certificates at design time, without addressing the question 
of how to certify inter-dependent software services running 
at all layers of the cloud stack. Also, existing approaches do 
not support certification combining different types of 
evidence, including static verification, testing, monitoring 
and trusted computing proofs for services at all layers of the 
cloud stack. 
II. NOVEL CLOUD CERTIFICATION INFRASTRUCTURE  
To address these limitations we are developing a novel 
Certification infrastrUcture for MULti-layer cloUd Services 
(CUMULUS). This infrastructure will provide models, 
processes and tools supporting the certification of 
compliance and security properties of all types of cloud 
services, i.e., infrastructure (IaaS), platform (PaaS) and 
software services (SaaS), through the use of multiple types 
of evidence including testing, monitoring and trusted 
computing proofs. It will also support incremental 
certification, if necessary. 
The utilisation of multiple types of evidence for 
producing security certificates is necessary as the 
assessment of certain security properties in clouds might be 
possible only through a combination of such evidence types. 
Trusted Computing Platform (TCP [1]) proofs, for instance, 
can assess the trustworthiness of the lower hardware level of 
the cloud stack. Consequently, combining certificates 
underpinned by TCP proofs with others based on testing and 
monitoring provides a comprehensive trust chain for 
covering further properties as well as hierarchically 
dependent services in higher layers of the cloud stack.  
The integration of results of different types of evidence 
requires novel hybrid certification models supporting the 
identification of gaps arising from evidence from a specific 
verification method (testing/monitoring/TCP) and finding 
ways of filling them by evidence from other methods. Test 
based certificates of software services that have been issued 
under certain operational conditions can, for example, be 
combined with monitoring data acquired in cases where the 
related conditions are violated to produce extended hybrid 
certificates for the properties of interest. Also, the test plan 
that has been used to produce the original certificate may 
provide the basis for assessing the length of monitoring 
activity required to validate the certificate under new 
conditions at run-time. Similarly, a hybrid certification 
model may support the combination of evidence coming 
from TCP-proofs with other testing and/or monitoring based 
certificates. A TCP proof can, for instance, provide evidence 
that an infrastructure configuration upon which a service 
instance runs is the same as the one for which the service 
was originally tested. Suppose, for example, that a service 
holds a test based certificate asserting a data integrity 
property if the service runs on an infrastructure that does not 
support multi-tenancy. Then, the existence of a formal TCP 
proof for single tenancy becomes a necessary pre-condition 
for verifying the applicability of the test-based certificate. In 
certain cases, integration of evidence requires the ability to 
combine existing certificates and freshly acquired raw 
evidence from all layers of the cloud stack to produce 
composite certificates (multi-layer certification models). 
The CUMULUS infrastructure supports also incremental 
certification. Incremental certification is needed to address a 
major limitation of traditional certification processes, 
namely their inability to cover changes that affect certified 
properties without having to re-certify from scratch. 
Incremental certification can be supported by continuous 
monitoring of cloud services to ensure the validity of 
previously verified properties following changes in the stack 
(e.g., deployment of new middleware and service instances). 
Certification based on continuous monitoring can achieve an 
awareness of the operational context that is hard to obtain 
with static certification techniques such as testing [8]. 
A conceptualization of the CUMULUS infrastructure is 
shown in Figure 1. The infrastructure includes: (a) security 
and certification models; (b) components producing core 
test, monitoring and trusted computing based certifications 
as well as multi-layer and components producing 
incremental and hybrid certifications (c) components 
providing certification related evidence from clouds (test 
and monitoring services and trusted computing platforms); 
(d) an interaction protocol for the provision of certification 
evidence; and (e) tools supporting the engineering of cloud 
services that can make use of the infrastructure. The 
infrastructure can be used by cloud certification authorities 
to generate certificates for SaaS, PaaS and IaaS services. 
Cloud service providers may also use it for self-certification 
and building services amenable to the types of certification 
supported by it. The development of CUMULUS 
infrastructure is the focus of a new FP7 European project. 
Figure 1: CUMULUS infrastructure 
Our certification-based approach is in line with 
emerging audit approaches based on logging and reporting 
of cloud operations [2][8] (e.g., GRC Stack and Cloud Trust 
Protocol [7]) and provides an evidential basis for assessing 
cloud security. However, it extends such approaches by 
focusing on the development of automated assessment 
schemes utilising operational evidence in association with 
online and offline cloud service tests and formal proofs of 
compliance. Furthermore, CUMULUS’s focus on 
certificate-based security assessment enables the 
establishment of clear liabilities in the overall process. 
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